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Necesito Fallo!!!!


Hola.. estoy buscando un fallo que me van a tomar para constitucional y no lo puedo encontrar por ningun lugar.. es Mcculloch vs. Maryland 1819... Si alguien sabe donde conseguirlo me avisa!!!...

Gracias!°!°!°!

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lozanoximena, aca te dejo el fallo... Eso si te vas a tener que dar maña con el Ingles porque en castellano no lo encontre:

[i]M'CULLOCH v. STATE, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)

17 U.S. 316 (Wheat.)

M'CULLOCH
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND et al.

February Term, 1819

[17 U.S. 316, 317] ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland. This was an action of debt, brought by the defendant in error, John James, who sued as well for himself as for the state of Maryland, in the county court of Baltimore county, in the said state, against the plaintiff in error, McCulloch, to recover certain penalties, under the act of the legislature of Maryland, hereafter mentioned. Judgment being rendered against the plaintiff in error, upon the following statement of facts, agreed and submitted to the court by the parties, was affirmed by the court of appeals of the state of Maryland, the highest court of law of said state, and the cause was brought, by writ of error, to this court.

It is admitted by the parties in this cause, by their counsel, that there was passed, on the 10th day of April 1816, by the congress of the United States, an act, entitled, 'an act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States;' and that there was passed on the 11th day of February 1818, by the general assembly of Maryland, an act, entitled, 'an act to impose a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the state of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature,' [17 U.S. 316, 318] which said acts are made part of this statement, and it is agreed, may be read from the statute books in which they are respectively printed. It is further admitted, that the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States, incorporated by the act of congress aforesaid, did organize themselves, and go into full operation, in the city of Philadelphia, in the state of Pennsylvania, in pursuance of the said act, and that they did on the ___ day of _____ 1817, establish a branch of the said bank, or an office of discount and deposit, in the city of Baltimore, in the state of Maryland, which has, from that time, until the first day of May 1818, ever since transacted and carried on business as a bank, or office of discount and deposit, and as a branch of the said Bank of the United States, by issuing bank-notes and discounting promissory notes, and performing other operations usual and customary for banks to do and perform, under the authority and by the direction of the said president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States, established at Philadelphia as aforesaid. It is further admitted, that the said president, directors and company of the said bank, had no authority to establish the said branch, or office of discount and deposit, at the city of Baltimore, from the state of Maryland, otherwise than the said state having adopted the constitution of the United States and composing one of the states of the Union. It is further admitted, that James William McCulloch, the defendant below, being the cashier of the said branch, or office of discount and [17 U.S. 316, 319] deposit, did, on the several days set forth in the declaration in this cause, issue the said respective bank-notes therein described, from the said branch or office, to a certain George Williams, in the city of Baltimore, in part payment of a promissory note of the said Williams, discounted by the said branch or office, which said respective bank-notes were not, nor was either of them, so issued, on stamped paper, in the manner prescribed by the act of assembly aforesaid. It is further admitted, that the said president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States, and the said branch, or office of discount and deposit, have not, nor has either of them, paid in advance, or otherwise, the sum of $15,000, to the treasurer of the Western Shore, for the use of the state of Maryland, before the issuing of the said notes, or any of them, nor since those periods. And it is further admitted, that the treasurer of the Western Shore of Mayland, under the direction of the governor and council of the said state, was ready, and offered to deliver to the said president, directors and company of the said bank, and to the said branch, or office of discount and deposit, stamped paper of the kind and denomination required and described in the said act of assembly.

The question submitted to the court for their decision in this case, is, as to the validity of the said act of the general assembly of Maryland, on the ground of its being repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and the act of congress aforesaid, or to one of them. Upon the foregoing statement of facts, and the pleadings in this cause (all errors in [17 U.S. 316, 320] which are hereby agreed to be mutually released), if the court should be of opinion, that the plaintifis are entitled to recover, then judgment, it is agreed, shall be entered for the plaintiffs for $2500, and costs of suit. But if the court should be of opinion, that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover upon the statement and pleadings aforesaid, then judgment of non pros shall be entered, with costs to the defendant.

It is agreed, that either party may appeal from the decision of the county court, to the court of appeals, and from the decision of the court of appeals to the supreme court of the United States, according to the modes and usages of law, and have the same benefit of this statement of facts, in the same manner as could be had, if a jury had been sworn and impannelled in this cause, and a special verdict had been fonnd, or these facts had appeared and been stated in an exception taken to the opinion of the court, and the court's direction to the jury thereon.

Copy of the act of the Legislature of the State of Maryland, referred to in the preceding statement.

An act to impose a tax on all banks or branches thereof, in the state of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature.

Be it enacted by the general assembly of Maryland, that if any bank has established, or shall, without authority from the state first had and obtained, establish any branch, office of discount and [17 U.S. 316, 321] deposit, or office of pay and receipt in any part of this state, it shall not be lawful for the said branch, office of discount and deposit, or office of pay and receipt, to issue notes, in any manner, of any other denomination than five, ten, twenty, fifty, one hundred, five hundred and one thousand dollars, and no note shall be issued, except upon stamped paper of the following denominations; that is to say, every five dollar note shall be upon a stamp of ten cents; every ten dollar note, upon a stamp of twenty cents; every twenty dollar note, upon a stamp of thirty cents; every fifty dollar note, upon a stamp of fifty cents; every one hundred dollar note, upon a stamp of one dollar; every five hundred dollar note, upon a stamp of ten dollars; and every thousand dollar note, upon a stamp of twenty dollars; which paper shall be furnished by the treasurer of the Western Shore, under the direction of the governor and council, to be paid for upon delivery; provided always, that any institution of the above description may relieve itself from the operation of the provisions aforesaid, by paying annually, in advance, to the treasurer of the Western Shore, for the use of state, the sum of $15,000.

And be it enacted, that the president, cashier, each of the directors and officers of every institution established, or to be established as aforesaid, offending against the provisions aforesaid, shall forfeit a sum of $500 for each and every offence, and every person having any agency in circulating any note aforesaid, not stamped as aforesaid directed, shall forfeit a sum not exceeding $100 [17 U.S. 316, 322] every penalty aforesaid, to be recovered by indictment, or action of debt, in the county court of the county where the offence shall be committed, one-half to the informer, and the other half to the use of the state.

And be it enacted, that this act shall be in full force and effect from and after the first day of May next.

February 22d-27th, and March 1st-3d.

Webster, for the plaintiff in error,3 stated: 1. That the question whether congress constitutionally possesses the power to incorporate a bank, might be raised upon this record; and it was in the discretion of the defendant's counsel to agitate it. But it might have been hoped, that it was not now to be considered as an open question. It is a question of the utmost magnitude, deeply interesting to the government itself, as well as to individuals. The mere discussion of such a question may most essentially affect the value of a vast amount of private property. We are bound to suppose, that the defendant in error is well aware of these consequences, and would not have intimated an intention to agitate such a question, but with a real design to make it a topic of serious discussion, and with a view of demanding upon it the solemn judgment of this court. This [17 U.S. 316, 323] question arose early after the adoption of the constitution, and was discussed and settled, so far as legislative decision could settle it, in the first congress. The arguments drawn from the constitution, in favor of this power, were stated and exhausted in that discussion. They were exhibited, with characteristic perspicuity and force, by the first secretary of the treasury, in his report to the president of the United States. The first congress created and incorporated a bank. Act of 5th February 1791, ch. 84. Nearly each succeeding congress, if not every one, has acted and legislated on the presumption of the legal existence of such a power in the government. Individuals, it is true, have doubted, or thought otherwise; but it cannot be shown, that either branch of the legislature has, at any time, expressed an opinion against the existence of the power. The executive government has acted upon it; and the courts of law have acted upon it. Many of those who doubted or denied the existence of the powers, when first attempted to be exercised, have yielded to the first decision, and acquiesced in it, as a settled question. When all branches of the government have thus been acting on the existence of this power, nearly thirty years, it would seem almost too late to call it in question, unless its repugnancy with the constitution were plain and manifest. Congress, by the constitution, is invested with certain powers; and as to the objects, and within the scope of these powers, it is sovereign. Even without the aid of the general clause in the constitution, [17 U.S. 316, 324] empowering congress to pass all necessary and proper laws for carrying its powers into execution, the grant of powers itself necessarily implies the grant of all usual and suitable means for the execution of the powers granted. Congress may declare war; it may consequently carry on war, by armies and navies, and other suitable means and methods of warfare. So, it has power to raise a revenue, and to apply it in the support of the government, and defence of the country; it may, of course, use all proper and suitable means, not specially prohibited, in the raising and disbursement of the revenue. And if, in the progress of society and the arts, new means arise, either of carrying on war, or of raising revenue, these new means doubtless would be properly considered as within the grant. Steam-frigates, for example, were not in the minds of those who framed the constitution, as among the means of naval warfare; but no one doubts the power of congress to use them, as means to an authorized end. It is not enough to say, that it does not appear that a bank was not in the contemplation of the framers of the constitution. It was not their intention, in these cases, to enumerate particulars. The true view of the subject is, that if it be a fit instrument to an authorized purpose, it may be used, not being specially prohibited. Congress is authorized to pass all laws 'necessary and proper' to carry into execution the powers conferred on it. These words, 'necessary and proper,' in such an instrument, are probably to be considered as synonymous. Necessarily, powers must here intend such powers as are suitable and [17 U.S. 316, 325] fitted to the object; such as are best and most useful in relation to the end proposed. If this be not so, and if congress could use no means but such as were absolutely indispensable to the existence of a granted power, the government would hardly exist; at least, it would be wholly inadequate to the purposes of its formation. A bank is a proper and suitable instrument to assist the operations of the government, in the collection and disbursement of the revenue; in the occasional anticipations of taxes and imposts; and in the regulation of the actual currency, as being a part of the trade and exchange between the states. It is not for this court to decide, whether a bank, or such a bank as this, be the best possible means to aid these purposes of government. Such topics must be left to that discussion which belongs to them, in the two houses of congress. Here, the only question is, whether a bank, in its known and ordinary operations, is capable of being so connected with the finances and revenues of the government, as to be fairly within the discretion of congress, when selecting means and instruments to execute its powers and perform its duties. A bank is not less the proper subject for the choice of congress, nor the less constitutional, because it requires to be executed by granting a charter of incorporation. It is not, of itself, unconstitutional in congress to create a corporation. Corporations are but means. They are not ends and objects of government. No government exists for the purpose of creating corporations as one of the ends of its being. They are institutions established to effect certain beneficial purposes; [17 U.S. 316, 326] and, as means, take their character generally from their end and object. They are civil or eleemosynary, public or private, according to the object intended by their creation. They are common means, such as all governments use. The state governments create corporations to execute powers confided to their trust, without any specific authority in the state constitutions for that purpose. There is the same reason that congress should exercise its discretion as to the means by which it must execute the powers conferred upon it. Congress has duties to perform and powers to execute. It has a right to the means by which these duties can be properly and most usefully performed, and these powers executed. Among other means, it has established a bank; and before the act establishing it can be pronounced unconstitutional and void, it must be shown, that a bank has no fair connection with the execution of any power or duty of the national government, and that its creation is consequently a manifest usurpation.

2. The second question is, whether, if the bank be constitutionally created, the state governments have power to tax it? The people of the United States have seen fit to divide sovereignty, and to establish a complex system. They have conferred certain powers on the state governments, and certain other powers on the national government. As it was easy to foresee that question must arise between these governments thus constituted, it became of great moment to determine, upon what principle these questions should be decided, and who should decide them. The constitution, therefore, declares, that the [17 U.S. 316, 327] constitution itself, and the laws passed in pursuance of its provisions, shall be the supreme law of the land, and shall control all state legislation and state constitutions, which may be incompatible therewith; and it confides to this court the ultimate power of deciding all questions arising under the constitution and laws of the United States. The laws of the United States, then, made in pursuance of the constitution, are to be the supreme law of the land, anything in the laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. The only inquiry, therefore, in this case is, whether the law of the state of Maryland imposing this tax be consistent with the free operation of the law establishing the bank, and the full enjoyment of the privileges conferred by it? If it be not, then it is void; if it be, then it may be valid. Upon the supposition, that the bank is constitutionally created, this is the only question; and this question seems answered, as soon as it is stated. If the states may tax the bank, to what extent shall they tax it, and where shall they stop? An unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy; because there is a limit beyond which no institution and no property can bear taxation. A question of constitutional power can hardly be made to depend on a question of more or less. If the states may tax, they have no limit but their discretion; and the bank, therefore, must depend on the discretion of the state governments for its existence. This consequence is inevitable. The object in laying this tax, may have been revenue to the state. In the next case, the object may be to expel the bank from the state; but [17 U.S. 316, 328] how is this object to be ascertained, or who is to judge of the motives of legislative acts? The government of the United States has itself a great pecuniary interest in this corporation. Can the states tax this property? Under the confederation, when the national government, not having the power of direct legislation, could not protect its own property by its own laws, it was expressly stipulated, that 'no impositions, duties or restrictions should be laid by any state on the property of the United States.' Is it supposed, that property of the United States is now subject to the power of the state governments, in a greater degree than under the confederation? If this power of taxation be admitted, what is to be its limit? The United States have, and must have, property locally existing in all the states; and may the states impose on this property, whether real or personal, such taxes as they please? Can they tax proceedings in the federal courts? If so, they can expel those judicatures from the states. As Maryland has undertaken to impose a stamp-tax on the notes of this bank, what hinders her from imposing a stamp-tax also on permits, clearances, registers and all other documents connected with imposts and navigation? If, by one, she can suspend the operations of the bank, by the other, she can equally well shut up the custom-house. The law of Maryland, in question, makes a requisition. The sum called for is not assessed on property, nor deducted from profits or income. It is a direct imposition on the power, privilege or franchise of the corporation. The act purports, also, to restrain [17 U.S. 316, 329] the circulation of the paper of the bank to bills of certain descriptions. It narrows and abridges the powers of the bank in a manner which, it would seem, even congress could not do. This law of Maryland cannot be sustained, but upon principles and reasoning which would subject every important measure of the national government to the revision and control of the state legislatures. By the charter. the bank is authorized to issue bills of any demonination above five dollars. The act of Maryland purports to restrain and limit their powers in this respect. The charter, as well as the laws of the United States, makes it the duty of all collectors and receivers to receive the notes of the bank in payment of all debts due the government. The act of Maryland makes it penal, both on the person paying and the person receiving such bills, until stamped by the authority of Maryland. This is a direct interference with the revenue. The legislature of Maryland might, with as much propriety, tax treasurynotes. This is either an attempt to expel the bank from the state; or it is an attempt to raise a revenue for state purposes, by an imposition on property and franchises holden under the national government, and created by that government, for purposes connected with its own administration. In either view, there cannot be a clearer case of interference. The bank cannot exist, nor can any bank established by congress exist, if this right to tax it exists in the state governments. One or the other must be surrendered; and a surrender on the part of the government of the United States would be a giving [17 U.S. 316, 330] up of those fundamental and essential powers without which the government cannot be maintained. A bank may not be, and is not, absolutely essential to the existence and preservation of the government. But it is essential to the existence and preservation of the government, that congress should be able to exercise its constitutional powers, at its own discretion, without being subject to the control of state legislation. The question is not, whether a bank be necessary or useful, but whether congress may not constitutionally judge of that necessity or utility; and whether, having so judged and decided, and having adopted measures to carry its decision into effect, the state governments may interfere with that decision, and defeat the operation of its measures. Nothing can be plainer than that, if the law of congress, establishing the bank, be a constitutional act, it must have its full and complete effects. Its operation cannot be either defeated or impeded by acts of state legislation. To hold otherwise, would be to declare, that congress can only exercise its constitutional powers, subject to the controlling discretion, and under the sufferance, of the state governments.

Hopkinson, for the defendants in error, proposed three questions for the consideration of the court. 1. Had congress a constitutional power to incorporate the bank of the United States? 2. Granting this power to congress, has the bank, of its own authority, a right to establish its branches in the several states? 3. Can the bank, and its branches thus established, claim to be exempt from the ordinary [17 U.S. 316, 331] and equal taxation of property, as assessed in the states in which they are placed?

1. The first question has, for many years, divided the opinions of the first men of our country. He did not mean to controvert the arguments by which the bank was maintained, on its original establishment. The power may now be denied, in perfect consistency with those arguments. It is agreed, that no such power is expressly granted by the constitution. It has been obtained by implication; by reasoning from the 8th section of the 1st article of the constitution; and asserted to exist, not of and by itself, but as an appendage to other granted powers, as necessary to carry them into execution. If the bank be not 'necessary and proper' for this purpose, it has no foundation in our constitution, and can have no support in this court. But it strikes us, at once, that a power, growing out of a necessity which may not be permanent, may also not be permanent. It has relation to circumstances which change; in a state of things which may exist at one period, and not at another. The argument might have been perfectly good, to show the necessity of a bank, for the operations of the revenue, in 1791, and entirely fail now, when so many facilities for money transactions abound, which were wanting then. That some of the powers of the constitution are of this fluctuating character, existing, or not, according to extraneous circumstances, has been fully recognised by this court at the present term, in the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield (ante, p. 122). Necessity was the plea and justification [17 U.S. 316, 332] of the first Bank of the United States. If the same necessity existed, when the second was established, it will afford the same justification; otherwise, it will stand without justification, as no other is pretended. We cannot, in making this inquiry, take a more fair and liberal test, than the report of General Hamilton, the father and defender of this power. The uses and advantages he states, as making up the necessity required by the constitution, are three. 1st. The augmentation of the active and productive capital of the country, by making gold and silver the basis of a paper circulation. 2d. Affording greater facility to the government, in procuring pecuniary aids; especially, in sudden emergencies; this, he says, is an indisputable advantage of public banks. 3d. The facility of the payment of taxes, in two ways; by loaning to the citizen, and enabling him to be punctual; and by increasing the quantity of circulating medium, and quickening circulation by bank-bills, easily transmitted from place to place. If we admit, that these advantages or conveniences amount to the necessity required by the constitution, for the creation and exercise of powers not expressly given; yet it is obvious, they may be derived from any public banks, and do not call for a Bank of the United States, unless there should be no other public banks, or not a sufficiency of them for these operations. In 1791, when this argument was held to be valid and effectual, there were but three banks in the United States, with limited capitals, and contracted spheres of operation. Very different is the case now, when we have a banking capital to a vast amount, vested in [17 U.S. 316, 333] banks of good credit, and so spread over the country, as to be convenient and competent for all the purposes enumerated in the argument. General Hamilton, conscious that his reasoning must fail, if the state banks were adequate for his objects, proceeds to show they were not. Mr. Hopkinson particularly examined all the objections urged by General Hamilton, to the agency of the state banks, then in existence, in the operations required for the revenue; and endeavored to show, that they had no application to the present number, extent and situation of the state banks; relying only on those of a sound and unquestioned credit and permanency. He also contended, that the experience of five years, since the expiration of the old charter of the Bank of the United States, has fully shown the competency of the state banks, to all the purposes and uses alleged as reasons for erecting that bank, in 1791. The loans to the government by the state banks, in the emergencies spoken of; the accommodation to individuals, to enable them to pay their duties and taxes; the creation of a circulating currency; and the facility of transmitting money from place to place, have all been effected, as largely and beneficially, by the state banks, as they could have been done by a bank incorporated by congress. The change in the country, in relation to banks, and an experience that was depended upon, concur in proving, that whatever might have been the truth and force of the bank argument in 1791, they were wholly wanting in 1816. [17 U.S. 316, 334] 2. If this Bank of the United States has been lawfully created and incorporated, we next inquire, whether it may, of its own authority, establish its branches in the several states, without the direction of congress, or the assent of the states? It is true, that the charter contains this power, but this avails nothing, if not warranted by the constitution. This power to establish branches, by the directors of the bank, must be maintained and justified, by the same necessity which supports the bank itself, or it cannot exist. The power derived from a given necessity, must be coextensive with it, and no more. We will inquire, 1st. Does this necessity exist in favor of the branches? 2d. Who should be the judge of the necessity, and direct the manner and extent of the remedy to be applied? Branches are not necessary for any of the enumerated advantages. Not for pecuniary aids to the government; since the ability to afford them must be regulated by the strength of the capital of the parent bank, and cannot be increased by scattering and spreading that capital in the branches. Nor are they necessary to create a circulating medium; for they create nothing; but issue paper on the faith and responsibility of the parent bank, who could issue the same quantity, on the same foundation; the distribution of the notes of the parent bank can as well be done, and in fact, is done, by the state banks. Where, then, is that necessity to be found for the branches, whatever may be allowed to the bank itself? It is undoubtedly true, that these branches are established with a single view to trading, and the profit of the stockholders, and not for the convenience [17 U.S. 316, 335] or use of the government; and therefore, they are located at the will of the directors, who represent and regard the interests of the stockholders, and are such themselves. If this is the case, can it be contended, that the state rights of territory and taxation are to yield for the gains of a money-trading corporation; to be prostrated at the will of a set of men who have no concern, and no duty but to increase their profits? Is this the necessity required by the constitution for the creation of undefined powers? It is true, that, by the charter, the government may require a branch in any place it may designate, but if this power is given only for the uses or necessities of the government, then the government only should have the power to order it. In truth, the directors have exercised the power, and they hold it, without any control from the government of the United States; and, as is now contended, without any control of the state governments. A most extravagant power to be vested in a body of men, chosen annually by a very small portion of our citizens, for the purpose of loaning and trading with their money to the best advantage! A state will not suffer its own citizens to erect a bank, without its authority, but the citizens of another state may do so; for it may happen that the state thus used by the bank for one of its branches, does not hold a single share of the stock. 2d. But if these branches are to be supported, on the ground of the constitutional necessity, and they can have no other foundation, the question occurs, who should be the judge of the existence of the necessity, in any proposed case; of the when and the where the power [17 U.S. 316, 336] shall be exercised, which the necessity requires? Assuredly, the same tribunal which judges of the original necessity on which the bank is created, should also judge of any subsequent necessity requiring the extension of the remedy. Congress is that tribunal; the only one in which it may be safely trusted; the only one in which the states to be affected by the measure, are all fairly represented. If this power belongs to congress, it cannot be delegated to the directors of a bank, any more than any other legislative power may be transferred to any other body of citizens: if this doctrine of necessity is without any known limits, but such as those who defend themselves by it, may choose, for the time, to give it; and if the powers derived from it, are assignable by the congress to the directors of a bank; and by the directors of the bank to anybody else; we have really spent a great deal of labor and learning to very little purpose, in our attempt to establish a form of government in which the powers of those who govern shall be strictly defined and controlled; and the rights of the government secured from the usurpations of unlimited or unknown powers. The establishment of a bank in a state, without its assent; without regard to its interests, its policy or institutions, is a higher exercise of authority, than the creation of the parent bank; which, if confined to the seat of the government, and to the purposes of the government, will interfere less with the rights and policy of the states, than those wide-spreading branches, planted everywhere, and influencing all the business of the community. Such an exercise of [17 U.S. 316, 337] sovereign power, should, at least, have the sanction of the sovereign legislature, to vouch that the good of the whole requires it, that the necessity exists which justifies it. But will it be tolerated, that twenty directors of a trading corporation, having no object but profit, shall, in the pursuit of it, tread upon the sovereignity of the state; enter it, without condescending to ask its leave; disregard, perhaps, the whole system of its policy; overthrow its institutions, and sacrifice its interests?

3. If, however, the states of this Union have surrendered themselves in this manner, by implication, to the congress of the United States, and to such corporations as the congress, from time to time, may find it 'necessary and proper' to create; if a state may no longer decide, whether a trading association, with independent powers and immunities, shall plant itself in its territory, carry on its business, make a currency and trade on its credit, raising capitals for individuals as fictitious as its own; if all this must be granted, the third and great question in this cause presents itself for consideration; that is, shall this association come there with rights of sovereignty, paramount to the sovereignty of the state, and with privileges possessed by no other persons, corporations or property in the state? in other words, can the bank and its branches, thus established, claim to be exempt from the ordinary and equal taxation of property, as assessed in the states in which they are placed? As this overwhelming invasion of state sovereignty is not warranted by any express clause or grant in the constitution, and never was [17 U.S. 316, 338] imagined by any state that adopted and ratified that constitution, it will be conceded, that it must be found to be necessarily and indissolubly connected with the power to establish the bank, or it must be repelled. The court has always shown a just anxiety to prevent any conflict between the federal and state powers; to construe both so as to avoid an interference, if possible, and to preserve that harmony of action in both, on which the prosperity and happiness of all depend. If, therefore, the right to incorporate a national bank may exist, and be exercised consistently with the right of the state, to tax the property of such bank within its territory, the court will maintain both rights; although some inconvenience or diminution of advantage may be the consequence. It is not for the directors of the bank to say, you will lessen our profits by permitting us to be taxed; if such taxation will not deprive the government of the uses it derives from the agency and operations of the bank. The necessity of the government is the foundation of the charter; and beyond that necessity, it can claim nothing in derogation of state authority. If the power to erect this corporation were expressly given in the constitution, still, it would not be construed to be an exclusion of any state right, not absolutely incompatible and repugnant. The states need no reservation or acknowledgment of their right; all remain that are not expressly prohibited, or necessarily excluded; and this gives our opponents the broadest ground they can ask. The right now assailed by the bank, is the right of taxing property within the territory of [17 U.S. 316, 339] This is the highest attribute of sovereignty, the right to raise revenue; in fact, the right to exist; without which no other right can be held or enjoyed. The general power to tax is not denied to the states, but the bank claims to be exempted from the operation of this power. If this claim is valid, and to be supported by the court, it must be, either, 1. From the nature of the property: 2. Because it is a bank of the United States: 3. From some express provision of the constitution: or 4. Because the exemption is indispensably necessary to the exercise of some power granted by the constitution.

1st. There is nothing in the nature of the property of bank-stock that exonerates it from taxation. It has been taxed, in some form, by every state in which a bank has been incorporated; either annually and directly, or by a gross sum paid for the charter. The United States have not only taxed the capital or stock of the state banks, but their business also, by imposing a duty on all notes discounted by them. The bank paid a tax for its capital; and exery man who deals with the bank, by borrowing, paid another tax for the portion of the same capital he borrowed. This species of property, then, so far from having enjoyed any exemption from the calls of the revenue, has been particularly burdened; and been thought a fair subject of taxation both by the federal and state governments.

2d. Is it then exempt, as being a bank of the United States? How is it such? In name only. Just as the Bank of Pennsylvania, or the Bank of Maryland, [17 U.S. 316, 340] are banks of those states. The property of the bank, real or personal, does not belong to the United States only, as a stockholder, and as any other stockholders. The United States might have the same interest in any other bank, turnpike or canal company. So far as they hold stock, they have a property in the institution, and no further; so long, and no longer. Nor is the direction and management of the bank under the control of the United States. They are represented in the board by the directors appointed by them, as the other stockholders are represented by the directors they elect. A director of the government has no more power or right than any other director. As to the control the government may have over the conduct of the bank, by its patronage and deposits, it is precisely the same it might have over any other bank, to which that patronage would be equally important. Strip it of its name, and we find it to be a mere association of individuals, putting their money into a common stock, to be loaned for profit, and to divide the gains. The government is a partner in the firm, for gain also; for, except a participation of the profits of the business, the government could have every other use of the bank, without owning a dollar in it. It is not, then, a bank of the United States, if by that we mean, an institution belonging to the government, directed by it, or in which it has a permanent, indissoluble interest. The convenience it affords in the collection and distribution of the revenue, is collateral, secondary, and may be transferred at pleasure to any other bank. It forms no part of the construction [17 U.S. 316, 341] or character of this bank; which, as to all its rights and powers, would be exactly what it now is, if the government was to seek and obtain all this convenience from some other source; if the government were to withdraw its patronage, and sell out its stock. How, then, can such an institution claim the immunities of sovereignty; nay, that sovereignty does not possess? for a sovereign who places his property in the territory of another sovereign, submits it to the demands of the revenue, which are but justly paid, in return for the protection afforded to the property. General Hamilton, in his report on this subject, so far from considering the bank a public institution, connected with, or controlled by, the government, holds it to be indispensable that it should not be so. It must be, says he, under private, not public, direction; under the guidance of individual interest, not public policy. Still, he adds, the state may be holder of part of its stock; and consequently (what? it becomes a public property? no!), a sharer of the profits. He traces no other consequenee to that circumstance. No rights are founded on it; no part of its utility or necessity arises from it. Can an institution, then, purely private, and which disclaims any public character, be clothed with the power and rights of the government, and demand subordination from the state government, in virtue of the federal authority, which it undertakes to wield at its own will and pleasure? Shall it be private, in its direction and interests; public, in its rights and privileges: a trading money-lender, in its business; an uncontrolled sovereign, in its powers? If the whole bank, with all its property and business, [17 U.S. 316, 342] belonged to the United States, it would not, therefore, be exempted from the taxation of the states. To this purpose, the United States and the several states must be considered as sovereign and independent; and the principle is clear, that a sovereign putting his property within the territory and jurisdiction of another sovereign, and of course, under his protection, submits it to the ordinary taxation of the state, and must contribute fairly to the wants of the revenue. In other words, the jurisdiction of the state extends over all its territory, and everything within or upon it, with a few known exceptions. With a view to this principle, the constitution has provided for those cases in which it was deemed necessary and proper to give the United States jurisdiction within a state, in exclusion of the state authority; and even in these cases, it will be seen, it cannot be done, without the assent of the state. For a seat of government, for forts, arsenals, dock-yards, &c., the assent of the state to surrender its jurisdiction is required; but the bank asks no consent, and is paramount to all state authority, to all the rights of territory, and demands of the public revenue. We have not been told, whether the banking-houses of this corporation, and any other real estate it may acquire, for the accommodation of its affairs, are also of this privileged order of property. In principle, it must be the same; for the privilege, if it exists, belongs to the corporation, and must cover equally all its property. It is understood, that a case was lately decided by the supreme court of Pennsylvania, and from which no appeal has been taken, on the part of the United [17 U.S. 316, 343] States, to this court, to show that United States property, as such, has no exemption from state taxation. A fort, belonging to the federal government, near Pittsburgh, was sold by public auction; the usual auction duty was claimed, and the payment resisted, on the ground, that none could be exacted from the United States. The court decided otherwise. In admitting Louisiana into the Union, and so, it is believed, with all the new states, it is expressly stipulated, 'that no taxes shall be imposed on lands, the property of the United States.' There can, then, be no pretence, that bank property, even belonging to the United States, is, on that account, exonerated from state taxation. 4

3d. If, then, neither the nature of the property, nor the interest the United States may have have in the bank, will warrant the exemption claimed, is there anything expressed in the constitution, to limit and control the state right of taxation, as now contended for? We find but one limitation to this essential right, of which the states were naturally and justly most jealous. In the 10th section of the 1st article, it is declared, that 'no state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws;' and there is a like prohibition to laying any duty of tonnage. Here, then, is the whole restriction or limitation, attempted to be imposed by the constitution, on the power of the states to raise revenue, drecisely in the same manner, from the same subjects, and to the same extent, that any sovereign and independent [17 U.S. 316, 344] state may do; and it never was understood by those who made, or those who received, the constitution, that any further restriction ever would, or could, be imposed. This subject did not escape either the assailants or the defenders of our form of government; and their arguments and commentaries upon the instrument ought not to be disregarded, in fixing its construction. It was foreseen, and objected by its opponents, that under the general sweeping power given to congress, 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,' &c., the states might be exposed to great dangers, and the most humiliating and oppressive encroachments, particularly in this very matter of taxation. By referring to the Federalist, the great champion of the constitution, the objections will be found stated, together with the answers to them. It is again and again replied, and most solemnly asserted, to the people of these United States, that the right of taxation in the states is sacred and inviolable, with 'the sole exception of duties on imports and exports;' that 'they retain the authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part of the national government to abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any article or clause of its constitution.' With the exception mentioned, the federal and state powers of taxation are declared to be concurrent; and if the United States are justified in taxing state banks, the same equal and concurrent authority will justify the state in taxing the Bank of the United States, or any [17 U.S. 316, 345] other bank. 5 The author begins No. 34, by saying, 'I flatter myself it has been clearly shown, in my last number, that the particular states, under the proposed constitution, would have co-equal authority with the Union, in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports.' Under such assurances from those who made, who recommended, and carried, the constitution, and who were supposed best to understand it, was it received and adopted by the people of these United States; and now, after a lapse of nearly thirty years, they are to be informed, that all this is a mistake, all these assurances are unwarranted, and that the federal government does possess most productive and important powers of taxation, neither on imports, exports or tonnage, but strictly internal, which are prohibited to the states. The question then was, whether the United States should have any command of the internal revenue; the pretension now is, that they shall enjoy exclusively the best portion of it. The question was then quieted, by the acknowledgment of a co-equal right; it is now to be put at rest, by the prostration of the state power. The federal government is to hold a power by implication, and ingenious inference from general words in the constitution, which it can hardly be believed would have been suffered in an express grant. If, then, the people were not deceived, when they were told that, with the exceptions mentioned, the state right of taxation is sacred and inviolable; and it be also true, [17 U.S. 316, 346] that the Bank of the United States cannot exist under the evercise of that right, the consequence ought to be, that the bank must not exist; for if it can live only by the destruction of such a right-if it can live only by the exercise of a power, which this court solemnly declared to be a 'violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any clause in the constitution'-we cannot hesitate to say, let it not live.

But, in truth, this is not the state of the controversy. No such extremes are presented for our choice. We only require, that the bank shall not violate state rights, in establishing itself, or its branches; that it shall be submitted to the jurisdiction and laws of the state, in the same manner with other corporations and other property; and all this may be done, without ruining the institution, or destroying its national uses. Its profits will be diminished, by contributing to the revenue of the state; and this is the whole effect that ought, in a fair and liberal spirit of reasoning, to be anticipated. But, at all events, we show, on the part of the state, a clear, general, absolute and unqualified right of taxation (with the exception stated); and protest against such a right being made to yield to implications and obscure constructions of indefinite clauses in the constitution. Such a right must not be defeated, by doubtful pretensions of power, or arguments of convenience or policy to the government; much less to a private corporation. It is not a little alarming, to trace the progress of this argument. 1. The power to raise the bank is founded on no provision of the constitution that has the most distant allusion to such an [17 U.S. 316, 347] institution; there is not a word in that instrument that would suggest the idea of a bank, to the most fertile imagination; but the bank is created by implication and construction, made out by a very subtle course of reasoning; then, by another implication, raised on the former, the bank, this creature of construction, claims the right to enter the territory of a state, without its assent; to carry on its business, when it pleases, and where it pleases, against the will, and perhaps, in contravention of the policy, of the sovereign owner of the soil. Having such great success in the acquirement of implied rights, the experiment is now pushed further; and not contented with having obtained two rights in this extraordinary way, the fortunate adventurer assails the sovereignty of the state, and would strip from it its most vital and essential power. It is thus with the famous fig tree of India, whose branches shoot from the trunk to a considerable distance; then drop upon the earth, where they take root and become trees, from which also other branches shoot, and plant and propagate and extend themselves in the same way, until gradually a vast surface is covered, and everything perishes in the spreading shade.

What have we opposed to these doctrines, so just and reasonable? Distressing inconveniences, ingeniously contrived; supposed dangers; fearful distrusts; anticipated violence and injustice from the states, and consequent ruin to the bank. A right to tax, is a right to destroy, is the whole amount of the argument, however varied by ingenuity, or embellished by eloquence. It is said, the states will abuse the power; and its exercise will [17 U.S. 316, 348] produce infinite inconvenience and embarrassment to the bank. Now, if this were true, it cannot help our opponents; because, if the states have the power contended for, this court cannot take it from them, under the fear that they may abuse it; nor, indeed, for its actual abuse; and if they have it not, they may not use it, however moderately and discreetly. Nor is there any more force in the argument, that the bank property will be subjected to double or treble taxation. Each state will tax only the capital really employed in it; and it is always in the power of the bank, to show how its capital is distributed. But it is feared, the capital in a state may be taxed in gross; and the individual stockholders also taxed for the same stock. Is this common case of a double taxation of the same article, to be a cause of alarm now? Our revenue laws abound with similar cases; they arise out of the very nature of our double government. So says the Federalist; and it is the first time it has been the ground of complaint. Poll taxes are paid to the federal and state governments; licenses to retail spirits; land taxes; and the whole round of internal duties, over which both governments have a concurrent, and, until now, it was supposed, a co-equal right. Were not the state banks taxed by the federal, and also by the state governments; in some, by a bonus for the charter; in others, directly and annually? The circumstance, that the taxes go to different governments, in these cases, is wholly immaterial to those who pay; unless it is, that it increases the danger of excess and oppression. It is justly remarked, on this subject, by [17 U.S. 316, 349] the Federalist, that our security from excessive burdens on any source of revenue, must be found in mutual forbearance and discretion in the use of the power; this is the only security, and the authority of this court can add nothing to it. When that fails, there is an end to the confederation, which is founded on a reasonable and honorable confidence in each other.

It has been most impressively advanced, that the states, under pretence of taxing, may prohibit and expel the banks; ships, about to sail, and armies on power, they may tax munitions of war; to; who, in their 31st number, treat it very properly. Surely, their march; nay, the spirit of the court is to be aroused by the fear that judicial proceedings will also come under this all-destroying power. Loans may be delayed for stamps, and the country ruined for the want of the money. But whenever the states shall be in a disposition to uproot the general government, they will take more direct and speedy means; and until they have this disposition, they will not use these. What power may not be abused; and whom or what shall we trust, if we guard, ourselves with this extreme caution? The common and daily intercourse between man and man; all our relations in society, depend upon a reasonable confidence in each other. It is peculiarly the basis of our confederation, which lives not a moment, after we shall coase to trust each other. If the two governments are to regard each other as enemies, seeking opportunities of injury and distress, they will not long continue friends. This sort of timid reasoning about the powers of the government, has not escaped the authors so often alluded [17 U.S. 316, 350] to; who, in their 31st number, treat it very properly. Surely, the argument is as strong against giving to the United States the power to incorporate a bank with branches. What may be more easily, or more extensively abused; and what more powerful engine can we imagine to be brought into operation against the revenues and rights of the states? If the federal government must have a bank for the purposes of its revenue, all collision will be avoided, by establishing the parent bank in its own district, where it holds an exclusive jurisdiction; and planting its branches in such states as shall assent to it; and using state banks, where such assent cannot be obtained. Speaking practically, and by our experience, it may be safely asserted, that all the uses of the bank to the government might be thus obtained. Nothing would be wanting but profits and large dividends to the stockholders, which are the real object in this contest. Whatever may be the right of the United States to establish a bank, it cannot be better than that of the states. Their lawful power to incorporate such institutions has never yet been questioned; whatever may be in reserve for them, when it may be found 'necessary and proper' for the interests of the national bank to crush the state institutions, and curtail the state authority. Granting, that these rights are equal in the two governments; and that the sovereignty of the state, within its territory, over this subject, is but equal to that of the United States; and that all sovereign power remains undiminished in the states, except in those cases in which it has, by the constitution, been [17 U.S. 316, 351] expressly and exclusively transferred to the United States: the sovereign power of taxation (except on foreign commerce) being, in the language of the Federalist, co-equal to the two governments; it follows, as a direct and necessary consequence, that having equal powers to erect banks, and equal powers of taxation on property of that description, being neither imports, exports or tonnage, whatever jurisdiction the federal government may exercise in this respect, over a bank created by a state, any state may exercise over a bank created by the United States. Now, the federal government has assumed the right of taxing the state banks, precisely in the manner in which the state of Maryland has proceeded against the Bank of the United States; and as this right has never been resisted or questioned, it may be taken to be admitted by both parties; and must be equal and common to both parties, or the fundamental principles of our confederation have been strangely mistaken, or are to be violently overthrown. It has also been suggested, that the bank may claim a protection from this tax, under that clause of the constitution, which prohibits the states from passing laws, which shall impair the obligation of contracts. The charter is said to be the contract between the government and the stockholders; and the interests of the latter will be injured by the tax which reduces their profits. Many answers offer themselves to this agreement. In the first place, the United States cannot, either by a direct law, or by a contract with a third party, take away any right from the states, not granted by the constitution; they [17 U.S. 316, 352] cannot do, collaterally and by implication, what cannot be done directly. Their contracts must conform to the constitution, and not the constitution to their contracts. If, therefore, the states have, in some other way, parted with this right of taxation, they cannot be deprived of it, by a contract between other parties. Under this doctrine, the United States might contract away every right of every state; and any attempt to resist it, would be called a violation of the obligations of a contract. Again, the United States have no more right to violate contracts than the states, and surely, they never imagined they were doing so, when they taxed so liberally the stock of the state banks. Again, it might as well be said, that a tax on real estate, imposed after a sale of it, and not then perhaps contemplated, or new duties imposed on merchandise, after it is ordered, violate the contract between the vendor and the purchaser, and diminishes the value of the property. In fact, all contracts in relation to property, subject to taxation, are presumed to have in view the probability or possibility that they will be taxed; and the happening of the event never was imagined to interfere with the contract, or its lawful obligations.

The Attorney-General, for the plaintiff in error, argued: 1. That the power of congress to create a bank ought not now to be questioned, after its exercise ever since the establishment of the constitution, sanctioned by every department of the government: by the legislature, in the charter of the bank, and other laws connected with the incorporation; by the [17 U.S. 316, 353] executive, in its assent to those laws; and by the judiciary, in carrying them into effect. After a lapse of time, and so many concurrent acts of the public authorities, this exercise of power must be considered as ratified by the voice of the people, and sanctioned by precedent. In the exercise of criminal judicature, the question of constitutionality could not have been overlooked by the courts, who have so often inflicted punishment for acts which would be no crimes, if these laws were repugnant to the fundamental law.

2. The power to establish such a corporation is implied, and involved in the grant of specific powers in the constitution; because the end involves the means necessary to carry it into effect. A power without the means to use it, is a nullity. But we are not driven to seek for this power in implication: because the constitution, after enumerating certain specific powers, expressly gives to congress the power 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or or in any department or officer thereof.' If, therefore, the act of congress establishing the bank was necessary and proper to carry into execution any one or more of the enumerated powers, the authority to pass it is expressly delegated to congress by the constitution. We contend, that it was necessary and proper to carry into execution several of the enumerated powers, such as the powers of levying and collecting taxes throughout this widely-extended empire; of paying [17 U.S. 316, 354] the public debts, both in the United States and in foreign countries; of borrowing money, at home and abroad; of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states; of raising and supporting armies and a navy; and of carrying on war. That banks, dispersed throughout the country, are appropriate means of carrying into execution all these powers, cannot be denied. Our history furnishes abundant experience of the utility of a national bank as an instrument of finance. It will be found in the aid derived to the public cause from the Bank of North America, established by congress, during the war of the revolution; in the great utility of the former Bank of the United States; and in the necessity of resorting to the instrumentality of the banks incorporated by the states, during the interval between the expiration of the former charter of the United States Bank, in 1811, and the establishment of the present bank in 1816; a period of war, the calamities of which were greatly aggravated by the want of this convenient instrument of finance. Nor is it required, that the power of establishing such a moneyed corporation should be indispensably necessary to the execution of any of the specified powers of the government. An interpretation of this clause of the constitution, so strict and literal, would render every law which could be passed by congress unconstitutional; for of no particular law can it be predicated, that it is absolutely and indispensably necessary to carry into effect any of the specified powers; since a different law might be imagined, which could be enacted, tending to the same object, though [17 U.S. 316, 355] not equally well adapted to attain it. As the inevitable consequence of giving this very restricted sense to the word 'necessary,' would be to annihilate the very powers it professes to create; and as so gross an absurdity cannot be imputed to the framers of the constitution, this interpretation must be rejected.

Another not less inadmissible consequence of this construction is, that it is fatal to the permanency of the constitutional powers; it makes them dependent for their being, on extrinsic circumstances, which, as these are perpetually shifting and changing, must produce correspondent changes in the essence of the powers on which they depend. But surely, the constitutionality of any act of congress cannot depend upon such circumstances. They are the subject of legislative discretion, not of judicial cognisance. Nor does this position conflict with the doctrine of the court in Sturges v. Crown-inshield (ante, p. 122). The court has not said, in that case, that the powers of congress are shifting powers, which may or may not be constitutionally exercised, according to extrinsic or temporary circumstances; but it has merely determined, that the power of the state legislatures over the subject of bankruptcies is subordinate to that of congress on the same subject, and cannot be exercised so as to conflict with the uniform laws of bankruptcy throughout the Union which congress may establish. The power, in this instance, resides permanently in congress, whether it chooses to exercise it or not; but its exercise on the part of the states [17 U.S. 316, 356] is precarious, and dependent, in certain respects, upon its actual exercise by congress. The convention well knew that it was utterly vain and nugatory, to give to congress certain specific powers, without the means of enforcing those powers. The auxiliary means, which are necessary for this purpose, are those which are useful and appropriate to produce the particular end. 'Necessary and proper' are, then, equivalent to needful and adapted; such is the popular sense in which the word necessary is sometimes used. That use of it is confirmed by the best authorities among lexicographers; among other definitions of the word 'necessary,' Johnson gives 'needful;' and he defines 'need,' the root of the latter, by the words, 'want, occasion.' Is a law, then, wanted, is there occasion for it, in order to carry into execution any of the enumerated powers of the national government; congress has the power of passing it. To make a law constitutional, nothing more is necessary than that it should be fairly adapted to carry into effect some specific power given to congress. This is the only interpretation which can give effect to this vital clause of the constitution; and being consistent with the rules of the language, is not to be rejected, because there is another interpretation, equally consistent with the same rules, but wholly inadequate to convey what must have been the intention of the convention. Among the multitude of means to carry into execution the powers expressly given to the national government, congress is to select, from time to time, such as are most fit for the purpose. It would have been impossible [17 U.S. 316, 357] to enumerate them all in the constitution; and a specification of some, omitting others, would have been wholly useless. The court, in inquiring whether congress had made a selection of constitutional means, is to compare the law in question with the powers it is intended to carry into execution; not

UNCUYO
gustius Premium II Creado: 29/04/08
te puedo pasar unicamente una pequeña explicacion del fallo por que el texto lo consigo unicamente en ingles
si sabes ingles metete aca que esta el fallo :


http://www.landmarkcases.org/mccullo...v_maryland.pdf


). El caso McCulloch versus Maryland, 1819, es el más significativo de lo que estamos afirmando donde se discutía la facultad del poder federal de crear un Banco de los Estados Unidos. En este caso, Marshall interpreta la cláusula de lo necesario y apropiado sentando el principio de la supremacía y fortificación de la Nación y hace surgir la doctrina de los poderes implícitos.
Esta teoría predica que el Congreso tiene la facultad de dictar todas las leyes “para poner en marcha los poderes que se le han otorgado” a la Nación y al gobierno de los Estados Unidos. Esta teoría encuentra su fundamento en la carta número treinta y uno de El Federalista que escribe Hamilton, y que completa con la carta número treinta y tres.
Estos poderes son llamados sobreentendidos, que son útiles y necesarios para cumplir con los poderes otorgados. En el caso Gibbons versus Ogden (1824) se sienta el principio de que los estados no pueden legislar ni trabar lo referido al comercio interestatal, este caso abrió la posibilidad de la hiperactividad comercial en Estados Unidos y repercutió en el rápido desarrollo económico del país.

UMSA
EJA Moderador Creado: 29/04/08
Te dejo una descripción del fallo hecha por William M. Berenson, conocido abogado estadounidense. Espero que sea útil.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819)

1. Hechos: El Gobierno Federal estableció una sucursal del Banco Central en Maryland. El Estado de Maryland impuso un impuesto sobre las transacciones del Banco Central. El Tesorero de los Estados Unidos, el señor McCulloch, demandó al Estado de Maryland, sosteniendo que un impuesto estatal sobre una actividad federal violaba la Constitución, particularmente, la supremacía del Gobierno Federal, según el Artículo VI. Por su parte, el Estado de Maryland sostuvo que no había violación de la Constitución ya que la misma creación del Banco Central por el Gobierno Federal era ultra vires, es decir, excedía de las facultades expresas que la Constitución le confiere al Gobierno Federal (La Sección 8 del Artículo I no establece la posibilidad de crear un Banco Central).

2. Facultad de crear un Banco: El Presidente del Tribunal, el Juez John Marshall, rechazó el argumento sostenido por el Estado de Maryland, estableciendo que la facultad de crear un banco era una facultad implícita que surgía de la Sección 8 del Artículo I, por razones de la llamada "cláusula elástica". Al respecto, el último párrafo de la Sección 8 del Artículo I dispone lo siguiente:

A. El Congreso tendrá facultad "Para expedir las leyes que sean necesarias y convenientes para poner en efecto los poderes anteriores y todos los demás que esta Constitución confiere al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos o cualquiera de sus departamentos o funcionarios".

B. El Juez Marshall observó que conforme con la Sección 8 del Artículo I, el Gobierno Federal tiene la facultad de establecer y recaudar impuestos, contraer empréstitos, reglamentar el comercio, declarar la guerra, reclutar, alistar y mantener ejércitos, además de otras facultades y concluyó que la creación de un banco central era necesaria y conveniente para la ejecución de dichas facultades por el Gobierno Federal.

C. El Juez Marshall rechazó el argumento sostenido por el Estado de Maryland de que la interpretación de la "cláusula de las leyes necesarias y convenientes" debía ser restringida y que las facultades del Gobierno Federal eran sólo aquellas expresamente establecidas en el texto de la Constitución. El Juez Marshall también observó que los Artículos de la Confederación (antes de la Constitución) habían fracasado ya que, precisamente, contaban con una disposición que establecía que el Gobierno Federal no tendría facultad alguna que no hubiese sido expresamente conferida en el texto mismo de dicho cuerpo legislativo. Asimismo, que el legislador, al redactar la Constitución había tenido en cuenta los problemas causados por esta disposición y que, como consecuencia, había decidido no incluirla. En el mismo sentido, que ésta cláusula no debía ser interpretada como un límite ya que, primero, tal interpretación era inconsistente con el espíritu de la Constitución y, segundo, la cláusula no había sido incluida en la Sección 9 del Artículo I sobre límites del Congreso, sino en la Sección 8 que contiene las facultades del Congreso.

UBA
Augusto Profesor Adjunto Nombrado Creado: 29/04/08
San Google tiene la respuesta

http://www.google.es/translate_t?hl=es

No de perfecto pero es de lo mejorcito... te hace una traduccion completamente literal,,, por o que en partes se complica,,, pero con atencion y cuidado se saca facilmente la interpretacion correcta de la traduccion hecha...

Aufwiedersehen

PD... tengo que practicar que en algun lado mis estudios en aleman

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